A prevalent view among college students just starting in academic philosophy courses is that morality is relative—either to individual beliefs (moral relativism) or to the collective views of cultures (cultural relativism). However, it is important to note that the overwhelming majority of academic philosophers reject both moral and cultural relativism, citing clear reasons for their stance. Even the small number of philosophers who advocate for moral or cultural relativism present sophisticated arguments that are often beyond the philosophical training of most undergraduates and are thus not directly relevant to introductory discussions.
This paper aims to examine the untenability of one specific form of relativism, known as “naive” or “simple” cultural relativism, using minimal philosophical jargon. Caveats: The focus is deliberately narrow, addressing only simple cultural relativism to thoroughly tackle the concerns raised by my students during a spirited two-hour discussion on the topic, and the philosophical reasoning is not rigorous by academic standards. (Forgive me–it’s been nearly eight years since I left philosophy graduate school!)
Introduction to Cultural Relativism
Cultural Relativism versus Moral Relativism
While similar, cultural relativism and moral relativism are distinct metaethical theories. Cultural relativism specifically deals with the belief that moral systems and values are rooted in cultural context, while moral relativism can extend to individual preferences beyond cultural influences. It’s crucial to clarify this distinction to prevent conflating individual moral subjectivity with broader cultural practices.
Defining Simple Cultural Relativism
Simple cultural relativism is a metaethical theory that asserts the variability of moral beliefs is tied to differences in cultural backgrounds and historical contexts. Simple cultural relativists use this observation about culturally dependent moral beliefs to justify a further claim–that there are no universal moral standards that apply to all human societies. In brief, the argument can be summed up as follows:
Simple Cultural Relativism
- Premise 1: Different cultures exhibit diverse moral beliefs, which evolve over time.
- Premise 2: If moral beliefs vary and evolve across different cultures, then morality is relative to each culture and historical period and there are no universal moral standards that apply to all human societies.
- Conclusion: Therefore, morality is relative to each culture and historical period and there are no universal moral standards that apply to all human societies.
Recall that there are more sophisticated defenders of cultural relativism who do not merely assert the dependence of morals on culture. This small contingent of philosophers addresses complex philosophical challenges, such as the apparent logical contradictions that inevitably arise from conflicting cultural moral beliefs. But again, these sophisticated arguments fall outside the purview of this paper.
Problems with Simple Cultural Relativism
As we delve into the problems with simple cultural relativism, note that I will not explain every major objection to the theory. I shall outline only the objections to simple cultural relativism that I think hold the most promise for convincing my students–my main audience–to reconsider their views and make room for nonrelativistic metaethical theories. Each objection I raise is sufficient to refute simple cultural relativism, so proponents of simple cultural relativism cannot defend their theory if they cannot satisfactorily address all objections. In other words, the only way they can dismiss the stance against simple cultural relativism is by satisfactorily addressing every single objection that I raise.
1. The Problem of Logical Contradiction
The problem of logical contradiction in simple cultural relativism arises not merely from the existence of diverse moral beliefs across cultures but from the relativist’s claim that all such beliefs are equally true. For instance, if one culture asserts that “truth-telling is paramount” and another holds that “deception is virtuous in certain contexts,” cultural relativism must acknowledge both as correct. However, this leads to a direct contradiction because these beliefs advocate for mutually exclusive actions in similar circumstances. The cultural relativist stance suggests that there is no overarching truth beyond these cultural specifics. Yet, by asserting that contradictory propositions (e.g., truth-telling is both paramount and not paramount) are both true, cultural relativism violates a fundamental principle of logic: the law of noncontradiction. This law asserts that contradictory statements cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time. Thus, adhering to this principle is essential for maintaining logical consistency.
Unless you are delving into a type of logic called paraconsistent logic, which is much too advanced for our purposes, adhering to the law or principle of noncontradiction is vital for any discussion to be meaningful. Compelling philosophical reasons (such as ex falso quodlibet) for adhering to the law of noncontradiction abound, but to avoid complicating matters, we will not be delving into the nitty gritty aspects of logic. It is sufficient for us to agree that the law of noncontradiction should be followed in any meaningful discussion. If you cannot agree on this, then no amount of argumentation will convince you to take this objection seriously.
However, if you do agree on this, we may proceed.
I shall summarize this objection to simple cultural relativism as follows:
First Objection to Simple Cultural Relativism
- Premise 1: If a theory is tenable, then it does not lead to contradictory propositions.
- Premise 2: Simple cultural relativism leads to contradictory propositions.
- Conclusion: Therefore, simple cultural relativism is untenable.
Based on our commitment to the law of noncontradiction, premise 1 is a given. The crux of the issue lies in Premise 2, which can be substantiated with further evidence and reasoning.
Take, for example, a culture that considers racial segregation to be morally reprehensible. They are automatically committed to the view that the proposition “Racial segregation is morally reprehensible” is true. In the simple cultural relativist’s view, then, the statement “racial segregation is morally reprehensible” is true.
On the contrary, another culture considers racial segregation to be morally permissible. This culture is automatically committed to a very different proposition, namely, that “Racial segregation is not morally reprehensible.” In the simple cultural relativist’s view, then, the statement “racial segregation is morally reprehensible” is false.
Thus, simple cultural relativism needs to violate the law of noncontradiction and thereby accept the same proposition as both true and false. Since we have already established in Premise 1 that any tenable theory must not be contradictory, we must conclude that simple cultural relativism is untenable.
2. Incoherence with Intuitively and Universally Accepted Moral Beliefs
One compelling objection to simple cultural relativism arises from its failure to account for moral beliefs that are intuitively and universally accepted, such as the prohibition against genocide. This moral belief, widely regarded as a universal norm, holds that the systematic extermination of an entire people is inherently wrong, regardless of cultural context. Simple cultural relativism, however, would force us to accept that if a culture deemed genocide acceptable, this action would be morally permissible under its standards. This stark contradiction between a universally condemned act and the relativist’s moral flexibility illustrates the theory’s inadequacy in handling extreme but clear-cut cases of moral wrongdoing.
But I don’t need to use extreme examples like genocide to make the point. It is also intuitively and universally accepted, for example, that the deliberate infliction of severe physical harm for self-gratification–absent any other justification–is morally wrong. Presumably, the simple cultural relativist accepts this universal moral dictum. For instance, one of my students, while arguing for simple cultural relativism, admitted that she would still believe that hurting others for fun is by default wrong, even if the culture in which she lives considers the infliction of harm for self-gratification morally permissible. Yet, as a simple cultural relativist, she cannot maintain her belief in the wrongness of this infliction of harm without making her stance incoherent. If she is committed to the simple cultural relativist stance, she is forced to conform to collective opinion and accept, in that hypothetical scenario, that hurting others for fun is morally permissible.
3. The Arbitrary Threshold of Cultural Acceptance
In our discussion today, one objection I raised to simple cultural relativism is that it is wholly arbitrary. For the sake of argument, assume that the aforementioned student bites the bullet and rejects the existence of all intuitively and universally accepted moral beliefs. In this case, she would maintain the counterintuitive claim that even the wrongness of the self-gratifying infliction of severe physical harm is subjective and relative to collective moral beliefs. She will also have to accept, in the hypothetical scenario in which everyone else believes the self-gratifying infliction of severe harm to be morally permissible, that such infliction of harm is indeed morally permissible. While I don’t believe my student will take this stance, I will go ahead and see where it takes us.
The student in question argued that the popularity of a moral belief determines the truth of that moral belief. Specifically, if and only if a majority of people within a culture believe a moral proposition to be true, then that proposition is true. This view entails the following:
Arbitrariness of Simple Cultural Relativism
- If at least 51 people in a culture consisting of, say, a hundred people believe that shooting deer for sport is wrong, then it is true that shooting deer is wrong.
- If at least 51 people in the same culture believe that shooting deer for sport is morally permissible, then it is false that shooting deer is wrong.
- If exactly 50 people in the same culture believe that shooting deer for sport is wrong while the other 50 believe the opposite, then it is either both true and false that shooting deer is wrong or neither true nor false that shooting deer for sport is wrong.
As I put it in the lesson, according to this simple cultural relativist stance, the rightness or wrongness of an act depends on arbitrary factors, such as the reproductive and moral indoctrination abilities of a group of people, not to mention the other completely arbitrary moral tipping point of 51 out of 100 people. (Notice also that this strand of simple cultural relativism leaves the possibility for situations in which moral propositions are both true and false, violating the law of noncontradiction, as well as moral propositions that are neither true nor false, violating another fundamental logical principle, the law of excluded middle.)
4. The Problem of Self-Defeat
The problem of self-defeat in simple cultural relativism is a critical flaw that undermines its philosophical tenability. Cultural relativism argues that the correctness of moral judgments is rooted entirely in cultural consensus, and thus, it varies from one culture to another. However, for cultural relativism to advocate for its own correctness universally is to contradict its foundational principle that all truths are culture-specific. This is akin to playing a game where the only rule is that “there are no rules.” Just as such a game rule negates itself by its very existence, so too cultural relativism cannot universally claim its correctness without contradicting its own principle. (If this analogy is difficult to grasp, consider the self-defeating utterance of a speaker who says, “I am not speaking”!)
This inherent contradiction reveals a fundamental weakness in the relativist framework: if cultural relativism is true, then it cannot claim universal validity without defeating its core argument that all moral truths depend on cultural contexts. Therefore, if cultural relativism insists on its own universal correctness, it ceases to be cultural relativism and collapses under its self-contradictory stance.
Counterarguments and Responses
To keep this discussion as simple as possible, I will be responding to only one counterargument–because my students have deployed only one, which they seemed to have reiterated ad nauseam for two hours straight. Their counterargument can be summed up as follows:
Counterargument for Simple Cultural Relativism
- Premise 1: Different cultures exhibit diverse moral beliefs, which evolve over time.
- Premise 2: If moral beliefs vary and evolve across different cultures, then morality is relative to each culture and historical period and there are no universal moral standards that apply to all human societies.
- Conclusion: Therefore, morality is relative to each culture and historical period and there are no universal moral standards that apply to all human societies.
Noticed the problem with this counterargument? That’s right. It is not a counterargument–it is the exact same argument for simple cultural relativism that was raised at the outset, and which I presented at the beginning of this paper. It is now time for the simple cultural relativists to respond to all four objections I have raised to their theory, which, as I have explained, is contradictory, incoherent, arbitrary, and self-defeating.
Suggestions for Further Reading
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